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STATE OF MAINE
Cumberland County Probate Court

Docket No.

LEWIS B. WHITE, Income and
Principal Beneficiary,
1970 ALICE W. ROSENBERG
IRREVOCABLE TRUST for the
Benefit of LEWIS B. WHITE

Petition to Permit Deviation
From the Terms of a Trust
18-A M.R.S.A. §§1-302,7-201, and
7-404.

Petitioner

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This proceeding involves the 1970 ALICE W. ROSENBERG IRREVOCABLE
TRUST for the benefit of LEWIS B. WHITE (“the Trust”) a private irrevocable
inter vivos trust, established by Alice W. Rosenberg of Portland, Maine as
Grantor and as initial Co-Trustee by written instrument dated August 4, 1970.

2.

A complete and exact copy of the written instrument establishing this Trust is
attached to this Petition as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.

3.

The Trust has not been registered.

4.

Pursuant to 18A M.R.S.A. (hereinafter “Probate Code”) §1-302 ( a), this Court
has jurisdiction over “all subject matter” relating to “(3) trusts”.

5.

Venue for this proceeding is proper in this Court because the Trust was
established in Portland, Maine and could have been registered in Portland.
Portland was the principal place of administration of the Trust and the corporate
trustee has been Fleet Bank of Maine, with a place of business in Portland. See
Probate Code §7-101, 7-201 and 7-202. Further, the Trust provides, in Item
TENTH, as follows:
The Trustees may apply to the Probate Court for Cumberland
County, State of Maine, or such other court as may have jurisdiction of the
subject matter for the confirmation of their appointment as Trustees of the
Trust, or for the interpretation hereof or for any other matter or thing in
1

connection herewith, if at any time such action shall be deemed by them
necessary or advantageous.
Pursuant to Probate Code §7-101, the foregoing provision constitutes a
“designation in the trust instrument” of the Trust’s “principal place of
administration”; therefore, registration in Portland at Cumberland County Probate
Court would have been proper. Accordingly, under Code §7-202, venue in
Cumberland County Probate Court is proper.
PARTIES
6.

Petitioner LEWIS B. WHITE of North Andover, Massachusetts is the named
beneficiary of the Trust and has been the income beneficiary since the Trust’s
inception. He has the right to quarterly payments of “all the net income of the
Trust after making the payments referred to in Section (A) of this ITEM THIRD
[which are discussed below in Paragraph 10] for and during the term of his natural
life”. Trust, ITEM THIRD, Paragraph (B). The Trustees may also make
payments of principal to Mr. White during his lifetime subject to certain
limitations, described infra, which are among the subjects of this Petition. Ibid..
Mr. White is now 78 years of age and is the son of the Trust Grantor, Alice W.
Rosenberg. Mrs. Rosenberg died on November 3, 1985.

7.

Interested parties are listed below. This is a non-contested proceeding. Waivers
of Notice of the interested patties are attached to this Petition as Exhibit B.
A.

Phyllis D. White of North Andover, Massachusetts. Mrs. White is the
Petitioner’s wife. Mrs. White is a contingent income beneficiary of the
Trust. ITEM THIRD, Paragraph (C )(1) (a). The Trustees also have the
right, in their discretion, to make payments of principal to Mrs. White,
after Mr. White’s death, subject to certain limitations, which limitations
are among the subjects of this Petition. Ibid. Mrs. White is 72 years of
age. Mr. & Mrs. White have no children.

B.

Steven Rowe, Attorney General of the State of Maine. Mr. Rowe has an
interest in the Trust due to the Attorney General’s responsibilities with
respect to public charities under 5 M.R.S.A. § 194. The Trust contains a
contingent charitable bequest in Item THIRD, Paragraph ( C) (5) ( a).

C.

There are no other vested income or remainder beneficiaries. However,
Mr. White has a limited power of appointment to dispose of certain
income which might become available, because of a.) contingent
dispositions of income to Mrs. White and/or b.) income remaining
available after the deaths of the Grantor and Mr. and Mrs. White, to
anyone he chooses other than himself, his estate, his creditors or the
creditors of his estate. Trust, ITEM THIRD, Paragraph ( C) (5) (b). Mr.
White also has a limited power of appointment to appoint, through his last
2

will and testament, the entire “principal and income thereon”, upon the
termination of the trust, to anyone he chooses, other than himself, his
estate, his creditors, the creditors of his estate, or any of his blood
relatives, (other than descendants). Id. Paragraph (5) ( a). In the event
that Mr. White fails fully and effectively to exercise his power of
appointment in accordance with Paragraph ( C) (5)( a), the non-appointed
principal and income is to be paid and distributed to colleges and
universities selected by the Trustees. Ibid.
D,

Fleet Bank. Fleet Bank is the sole current Trustee, having been so
appointed on April 12, 1997 . 1*3 Ms. Barbara Warner is the Bank’s
“relationship manager” with respect to the Trust.
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THIS PROCEEDING

8.

This proceeding is brought for the following purpose: to seek the Court’s
approval, pursuant to Probate Code §§ 7-201 ( a) and 7-404 ( a), for the Trustee
to deviate from the terms of the trust and to approve a First Amendment to the
Trust. The proposed First Amendment to the Trust is attached to this Petition as
Exhibit D.
SPECIFIC FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES

9.

The Trust
The Trust was created in August 1970 for the purpose of providing long term
financial protection for the named beneficiary, Lewis B. White, the Petitioner. At
the time, in the words of the first introductory paragraph of the Trust, Mr. White,
who was then 46 years of age, had “ a number of strongly entrenched obsessions
and compulsions, foremost among these being a preoccupation with the
possibility that he may inadvertently give away his property”.
In order to alleviate the potential financial consequences of Mr. White’s illness,
the White family’s attorney, along with Mr. White himself, devised a way of
using Mr. White’s own property to fund a Trust to ensure his long term financial
protection. (The specific circumstances which led to the creation of the Trust are
set forth in an affidavit of Mr. White’s, attached to this Petition as Exhibit E.)
The attorney, Daniel T. Drummond, Jr., Esq., and Mr. White devised a plan by
which Mr. White’s mother, Mrs. Rosenberg would purchase the one-quarter
interest that Mr. White owned in a parcel of commercial real estate in Portland in
return for a promissory note for $47,500, payable at 5% interest. (The actual Note
is attached to the Trust as Appendix A.) The Grantor then conveyed the interest
she had purchased in the real estate to the Trust, as set forth in the introductory

1 Fleet Bank is both the corporate successor to Northeast Bank o f Lewiston and Auburn, the co-trustee
appointed December 5, 1979 and the trustee appointed in its own right April 12,1997. See Exhibit C.
3

paragraph of the Trust, by means of a deed conveying said interest to the Trust. A
copy of the deed is attached to the Trust as Appendix B. The Trustees then sold
the real estate on January 2, 1980 receiving for the Trust proceeds of said sale of
$118,750.
Mrs. Rosenberg and Mr. Drummond have since died; of the persons involved in
the creation of the Trust, only Mr. White survives.
Mr. White has been and remains during his lifetime, the only income beneficiary
of the Trust. He has been paid income by the Trustees since the Trust’s inception.
The Trust’s corpus, which was originally worth $47,500, (the amount of Mrs.
Rosenberg’s promissory note given in exchange for the property) had grown to
$289,739 as of June 30, 2002. See Schedule of Assets attached as Exhibit F.
10.

Principal Provisions of the Trust.
The Trust is an exceedingly complicated one. Its principal provisions are
summarized in this section of this Petition. Those sections of the Trust from
which permission is sought to deviate, are reviewed below in the Section entitled
“Particular Changes Requested.” The Trust initially directs the Trustees to make
all current interest payments required by the Note which Mrs. Rosenberg gave to
her son Lewis in payment for the real estate. ITEM THIRD Paragraph (A)
According to the Note, the Trustees were to do so in 95 consecutive annual
payments of $500 each, which would indeed have amounted to $47,500. After
making the payments on the Note provided for in ITEM THIRD Paragraph ( A),
the Trustees are directed to make quarterly payments to Lewis of “all the net
income of the Trust” during Lewis’s lifetime. ITEM THIRD Paragraph (B). In
addition, the Trustees have the discretion to make payments of principal to Lewis
“to properly and comfortably care for, support and maintain him (including
housing, clothing, feeding, recreation, travel, entertainment, medical and other
health expenses)” but such payments of principal are limited to “no more than
$5,000 of principal” in any 6 month period. Ibid. (The latter restriction was added
at Mr. White’s request, which he now regrets. See Exhibit E, Paragraph 7.)

11.

The Trust is to terminate on the day immediately preceding the expiration of a 21year period after the death of the last survivor of Lewis, the Grantor and Phyllis
D.White, Lewis’s wife. ITEM THIRD Paragraph C (Only Lewis and Phyllis D.
White now survive.) Subject to certain limitations to be discussed infra, if Phyllis
survives Lewis and the Grantor, Phyllis is to be paid 100% of the net income of
the Trust during her lifetime. Id. ( c) (1) ( a). Further, the Trustees have discretion
to pay principal to Phyllis during her lifetime using the same standards that
pertain to the payment of principal to Lewis during his lifetime. However,
payments of principal are to be limited to $7,500 in any one year, after the death
of the Grantor. Ibid.
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If, however, Phyllis White has not met certain standards pertaining to her
companionship with Lewis during his lifetime, her payments of income are to be
limited to 40% of the net income and Lewis has the right to appoint the remaining
60% of the net income, if the Grantor is not then alive. Id. ( C) (5) (b) Mr. White
also has the right to appoint the net income of the Trust after the death of the last
survivor of the Grantor, himself and Phyllis until the termination of the Trust,
which is to occur 21 years after the death of the last survivor of the three of them.
If Lewis fails to exercise his power of appointment, the Trustees are to distribute
the remaining principal of the Trust and the income thereon to “colleges and
universities selected by the Trustees, in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion,
but no college or university system should receive more than $500 . . . Id. ( C)
(5) ( a).
PARTICULAR CHANGES REQUESTED
12

a.

ITEM THIRD, PARAGRAPH (B)

The Trust permits the Trustees to make payments of principal to Mr. White “in
their absolute and uncontrolled discretion..., without taking into consideration
such other support and assets as he shall then have, but taking into consideration
his life expectancy, to properly and comfortably care for, support and maintain
him (including housing, clothing, feeding, recreation, travel, entertainment,
medical and other health expenses)”, but they are limited to payments of no more
than $5,000 in any six month period. ITEM THIRD, Paragraph (B). As
discussed below, this $10,000 limitation on annual payments of principal is now a
much smaller proportion of the assets than it was when the Trust was originally
funded. The amount of money stated in the Trust no longer suffices to meet the
stated needs of Mr. White. Further, Mr. White is now thirty-two years older than
he was when the Trust was created, his mother has died (who had certain rights to
principal and income if she survived Mr. White) and there is no longer any
compelling reason severely to limit the amount of principal that the Trustees may
pay Mr. White annually.
DEVIATION REQUESTED
Accordingly, Petitioner requests that the Trustees be permitted to pay him, still in
their discretion however, a total amount of $30,000 of principal per year, or three
times what was originally permitted. This is an entirely reasonable adjustment as
the Trust assets are now more than six times what they were at the creation of the
Trust. Moreover, due to the effects of inflation since 1970, it now costs about
$46,353 to purchase what $10,000 would have bought in 1970. The average
annual inflation since August, 1970, when the Trust was created, has been 4.9%.2

2 Sources: “The Inflation Calculator” (website) and telephone conversation with Professor Bert Smoluk,
Ph.D., assistant professor o f econom ics, University o f Southern M aine, June 26, 2002.
5

13.

b.

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

In addition to the increase in the cap on the annual payments of principal that may
be made to Mr. White, Petitioner requests a special, one-time only payout of
principal to compensate him for the deleterious effects of inflation since 1970 on
the value of the limited principal payments he has been permitted to receive.
Since 1970, the Consumer Price Index has increased by almost five times.
Therefore, the value of Mr. White’s potential annual payments of principal has
been reduced by almost eighty percent. In order to achieve at least a minimal
level of compensation for this reduction in value, Mr. White seeks a single pay
out of principal from the Trust of $40,000, to be called the “Special Payment”.
Mr. White also seeks the inclusion of language in the Trust instructing the
Trustees that the Special Payment shall not be taken into account in their
decisions concerning the discretionary annual payments of principal that may be
made pursuant to Item Third, Paragraph B of the Trust.
14

c.

ITEM THIRD 1 Cl

Paragraph C provides the first indication when the Trust will terminate:
Twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor of Lewis, the
Grantor, and Phyllis D. White (whether or not the marriage of said Phyllis
and Lewis is ever deemed valid or is invalidated).
There is no apparent reason for the Trust to continue for twenty-one years after
the Grantor, Mr. White’s wife and Mr. White have all died. Under ITEM THIRD
Paragraph ( C) (5 ) ( a) of the Trust as now written, Mr. White has the right to
“appoint” all o f the Trust’s remaining (upon termination) principal and accrued
income in his Last Will and Testament. Given the twenty-one year time lag after
the three deaths this seems a pointlessly-deferred right since Mr. and Mrs. White
do not have any children and Mr. White would prefer not to make decisions
whose effect would be so delayed.
REQUESTED DEVIATION
Paragraph ( C) should be revised to provide that the Trust will terminate fifteen
months after the Trustee learns of the death of the last survivor of Mr. White’s
mother, his wife and Mr. White. Amendment No. 1 retains Mr. White’s power to
appoint the remaining principal and income, (if any, at that point) but moves up
the date of termination of the Trust to the day following the expiration of fifteen
months following the death of the last-to-die of the three persons.

6
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d.

ITEM THIRD T O f i n a l

This section of the Trust concerns the payment of income and principal to Mr.
White’s wife Phyllis, if she survives him. There are two aspects of this Section
that should be revised, as follows:
1.

First, Phyllis’s right to receive income from the Trust after Mr.
White’s death is dependent, in part, on whether she shall have been “a
companion to Lewis for parts of six of the twelve calendar months
preceding his death or was prevented from being such by reason of his or
her being hospitalized (the Trustees to be most liberal in determining
whether Phyllis D. White has met such qualifications)....” Circumstances
today are very different than they were in 1970. Mr. and Mrs. White
recently celebrated their thirty-fourth wedding anniversary, having been
married, without interruption since June 28, 1968. Accordingly, this
provision is no longer warranted.

DEVIATION REQUESTED
Eliminate all language in the Trust requiring Phyllis D. White to have been a
companion to Lewis White for specific periods of time in order to be eligible to
receive income and/or principal.
2.

This section also limits the Trustees’ right, in their discretion, to pay Mrs.
White any o f the Trust principal until “five years have elapsed after the
Trustees have received information of the death of Lewis and have
determined that the information is reliable and only if five years have
elapsed after the Trustees began making payments of income to Phyllis,
after the death of Lewis pursuant to the provisions of this Paragraph 1 of
Section C.” This provision was included in the Trust because of concerns
related to Mr. White’s psychological condition at the time - thirty-two years
ago. Requiring the Trustees to wait five years after receiving information of
Mr. White’s death and after beginning to make payments of income to
Phyllis after his death, no longer makes sense. An additional questionable
aspect of this Section is the limitation (toward the end of the Section) that
the Trustees, notwithstanding that they have the “absolute and uncontrolled
discretion”, after Mr. White’s death, to pay Phyllis portions, or possibly all,
of the principal of the trust “to properly and comfortably care for, support
and maintain Phyllis (including housing, clothing, feeding, recreation,
travel, entertainment, medical and other health expenses)”, (subject to the
conditions described above in paragraph 2) are limited to paying “no more
than $7,500 of principal” annually to Phyllis, (after the Grantor’s death).
Again this amount, which was once approximately 15 per cent of the Trust’s
assets, is now only about 2 per cent of the Trust’s assets and will of course
buy a great deal less than it would in 1970.
7

DEVIATION REQUESTED

To the extent that the Trustees have the right to pay principal to Phyllis after Mr.
White’s death, that right should not be delayed for five years after the Trustees
have received information of Mr. White’s death and after having begun making
payments of income to Phyllis. Rather, the Trustees should have the discretionary
right to make annual payments of no more than $25,000 of principal to Mrs.
White beginning fifteen months after receiving information of Mr. White’s death,
and determining that the information is reliable. Further, after Mr. White has
died, and before the 15-month period has expired, Mrs. White should be entitled
to a single payment of principal that is the same as that which Mr. White could
have received annually: $30,000.
16

e.

ITEM THIRD ( Cl 121

This subsection limits the income that Phyllis D. White may receive from the
Trustees after the death of Lewis and the Grantor, if she has not met the
“companionship standards”, to 40 per cent of the available income of the Trust;
Mr. White has the right to appoint the remaining 60 per cent of the income which
is not paid to Mrs. White.
DEVIATION REQUESTED
That the reference to the “remaining 60 per cent” of the Trust income be deleted
and that the Section be rewritten so as to pay aft of the available income to Phyllis
after Mr. White’s death and his mother’s.
17.

g.

ITEM THIRD ( O (51 (at

At the end of this subparagraph there is a contingent charitable distribution to
“colleges and universities selected by the Trustees, in their absolute and
uncontrolled discretion”. This bequest would only occur if Mr. White fails to
exercise the powers of appointment referred to above. However, the charitable
bequest is limited to no more than $500 per college or university, “however many
distributees may be required”. This provision, at the current value of the Trust,
will require that about 600 checks in amounts of $500 or less be mailed to
colleges and universities. Further, this section contains no reference to any means
of determining the legitimacy of any of the colleges or universities selected by the
Trustees. It seems apparent that the process of selecting, addressing and writing
checks to 700 or so colleges will cost more than it will be worth to any single
institution and that the receipt by most institutions of $500, while worth
something, will be worth very little in dollars valued several years from now, i.e.
8

after Mr. and Mrs. White have both died and at least an additional fifteen months
have elapsed.

DEVIATION REQUESTED
That the contingent bequest to colleges and universities described above be
revised to require that the colleges and universities so selected be accredited by an
appropriate national academic association and, further, that the limitation to $500
gifts be revised to permit gifts of up to the amount of $10,000 each.
18.

h.

ITEM THIRD ( C) (5) lb)

This Section refers to Mr. White’s power of appointment to allocate the 60 per
cent of income referred to above in Item 16, and the entire income of the Trust
after the deaths of the Grantor and Mr. and Mrs. White. Since we have requested
that the limitation with respect to Mrs. White be eliminated, that is, that she be
entitled to receive the entire income after Mr. White’s death while she is alive,
there is no longer any reason to retain the language in this section referring to the
“remaining 60% income”. However, since this Petition seeks a reduction in the
period of time that the Trust will continue after the deaths of the Grantor and Mr.
and Mrs. White, but still maintains a fifteen-month period, it will still be possible
for Mr. White to appoint the Trust’s net income during that fifteen-month period.
DEVIATION REQUESTED
Accordingly, the language referring to the power to appoint “the remaining 60%
income” of ITEM THIRD ( C) (5) (b) should be deleted.
20

i. ITEM THIRD fPl
Paragraph D contains a reiteration and discussion of the “five year period for
determining that the report of the death of Lewis is not erroneous”. As discussed
above in Paragraph 12, Petitioner requests that the five-year period be revised to a
fifteen-month period. Further, Petitioner has requested that during the fifteenmonth period, Mrs. White should be entitled to a single discretionary annual
payment of principal in the same amount that Mr. White would have been entitled
to: $30,000.
DEVIATION REQUESTED
Accordingly Paragraph D of ITEM THIRD should be revised to refer to a fifteenmonth period, and to permit a payment of principal to Mrs. White, as outlined
above.
9

21

AMENDMENT AS REQUESTED DEVIATION

The Trust is irrevocable and the Trust instrument does not permit amendment.
See Trust Item Seventh. Since the Trust does not by its terms permit amendment,
it has become necessary to petition the Probate Court, which has the power to
“relieve a Trustee from any restrictions on his power that would otherwise be
placed upon him by the Trust or by this Code.” 18-AM.R.S.A. §7-404 ( a). In
this proceeding petitioner requests the Court’s permission to amend the Trust as
set forth in the First Amendment.
22.

BASIS FOR GRANTING PETITION TO PERMIT DEVIATION
As noted above, the Probate Code plainly authorizes the Probate Court, as a
“court of competent jurisdiction to relieve a Trustee from any restrictions on his
power” ... .for cause shown and upon petition of the Trustee or affected
beneficiary and upon appropriate notice to the affected parties.” 18 M.R.S.A. §7404 ( a). Petitioner here requests the Court to permit deviation to the extent of
approving the First Amendment, which would not otherwise be a permissible
amendment to the Trust, and the Trustee concurs in Petitioner’s request.
The Court should permit the requested deviation because amending the Trust to
remove or reduce certain restrictions on the Trustees on their right to pay out
income and/or principal to Mr. and Mrs. White is in the best interest of all
affected parties, all of whom freely agree to it. It is important to emphasize that
this Trust was intended to benefit Mr. White, who is the Petitioner and, following
his death, Mrs. White. There is abundant language in the Trust reflecting the
Grantor’s desire that both Mr. and Mrs. White receive such funds from the Trust
as may be necessary to “properly and comfortably care for, support and maintain”
each of them. See Item Third, Paragraph (B) and Paragraph ( C) (1) ( a). There
were and are no other beneficiaries, other than the Grantor, Mr. White’s mother,
who is deceased. The Trust was not written to benefit any issue of Mr. and Mrs.
White, and, in any event, they have no children. If the Trust remains as currently
written, it is highly possible that Mr. and Mrs. White will die without having
received the financial support they need from a Trust which was created to benefit
them. The Whites could benefit substantially now if the restrictions on the
Trustees’ ability to provide principal to Mr. White were relaxed, and Mrs. White
could benefit significantly, should she survive Mr. White, if the Trustees’ ability
to pay income and principal to her after Mr. White’s death were relaxed.
In Canal National Bank v. Old Folks ’Home Association, 347 A. 2nd 428 (Me.
1975), the Law Court stated that it has always permitted modifications to trust
administrative provisions if “(1) consistent with the settlor’s primary intent and
(2) required by necessitous circumstances”. 347 A. 2nd 428,436. See also Porter
v. Porter, 20 A. 2nd 465 (1941). Here, inasmuch as Petitioner is the primary
10

intended beneficiary, there is no doubt that the proposed modification carries out
the Settlor’s primary intent, which was to provide financial security to Petitioner.
Although the term “necessitous circumstances” resists precise definition, the
circumstances of this Trust, as discussed above in Paragraphs 9 through 20
certainly meet any reasonable understanding of that term.

Wherefore, Petitioner therefore respectfully requests that the Court authorize the
Trustee to deviate from the express terms of the Trust as set forth in the First Amendment
to the Trust.
Dated this

/ (

day of

William A. McCue
Attorney for Petitioner
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am above the age of 18 years and am not under any legal disability which would prevent my execution of this
waiver.
I am aware that I have or may have an interest in the estate to which this waiver relates and that I may have a
legal right to participate in hearings relating to this estate and to have notice of all such hearings as well as of all
relevant filings and orders given to me.
(Check General or Limited Waiver. IF NEITHER IS CHECKED, THIS IS A GENERAL WAIVER.)
□ General waiver:
I hereby revoke any previous demand for notice I may have filed and waive all rights to further notice of any
proceedings, hearings, filings, orders or other matters related to this estate until I may revoke this waiver in a
writing filed with the court. I do not, by this waiver, waive any right I may have to receive any benefit from this
estate to which I may be, by law, entitled.
□ Limited waiver:
Without revoking any previous demand for notice I may have filed I waive my rights to notice with respect
to the following proceedings only:

D ated__________________________ , 19____

_________________________________
Person Waiving Notice or his Attorney

Name, address and telephone number of attorney, if any, for person waiving notice.

See 18-A MRSA § 1-402 and Rule 4D.

